Finance, inequality and the poor. by Beck, T.H.L. et al.
  1 
 
Finance, Inequality and the Poor 
Thorsten Beck 
The World Bank 
 
Asli Demirgüç-Kunt 
The World Bank 
 
Ross Levine* 
Brown University and the National Bureau of Economic Research 
 
January 26, 2007 
  
Abstract: Financial development disproportionately boosts incomes of the poorest quintile and 
reduces income inequality.  About 40% of the long-run impact of financial development on the 
income growth of the poorest quintile is the result of reductions in income inequality, while 60% 
is due to the impact of financial development on aggregate economic growth.  Furthermore, 
financial development is associated with a drop in the fraction of the population living on less 
than $1 a day, a result which holds when conditioning on average growth.  These findings 
emphasize the importance of the financial system for the poor. 
 
 
JEL Codes: O11, O16, G00 






Corresponding author: Thorsten Beck, The World Bank, Mail Stop MC 3-300, 1818 H Street N.W.,  
 Washington, D.C. 20433, USA, 202- 473-3215, tbeck@worldbank.org. 
 
*We would like to thank Aart Kraay for sharing his data with us.  Daron Acemoglu, Biagio Bossone, 
Francois Bourguignon, Gerard Caprio, Maria Carkovic, Michael Fuchs, Alan Gelb, Patrick Honohan, 
Aart Kraay, Ashoka Mody, Martin Ravallion, two anonymous referees and seminar participants at the 
American Economic Association meetings, Brown University, Bilkent University, the University of 
Minnesota, the Wharton School, and the World Bank provided helpful comments.  We thank Meghana 
Ayyagari, Carlos Espina and April Knill for outstanding research assistance. This paper’s findings, 
interpretations, and conclusions are entirely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the 
views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.   2 
1. Introduction 
There are stunning cross-country differences in the distribution of income and the 
prevalence of poverty. According to the Human Development Report (2005), the ratio of the 
incomes of the richest 20 percent of the population to the poorest 20 percent exceeded 17 in 21 
countries, but was less than five in 27 others. In some countries, essentially nobody lives on less 
than $1 per day, but in 22 countries more than one-third of the people live below this commonly 
used poverty line.  Furthermore, income distribution and poverty are not stagnant. Finland, 
France, and Turkey experienced declines in their Gini coefficients of about one percent per 
annum over the last 30 years, while Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States experienced 
correspondingly rapid increases.  In Thailand, the percentage of the population living on less 
than $1 a day in 2000 was one-tenth of the level in 1981, while the rate doubled in Venezuela. 
In this paper, we examine the impact of financial development on the poor by estimating 
the relationship between finance and changes in both income distribution and poverty levels.  
Financial development may affect the poor through two channels: aggregate growth and changes 
in the distribution of income.  Consider first relative poverty as measured by income per capita 
of the lowest quintile, YP.  If we define Y as average income per capita, and L as the Lorenz 
curve, which relates the share of income received to the share of the population, then Yp ≡  
Y*L(0.2)/0.2. Differentiating and letting g(x) represent the growth rate of variable x, yields 
g(Yp) = g(Y) + g(L(0.2)). The growth rate of per capita income of the poorest quintile equals the 
growth of average per capita income plus the growth of the Lorenz curve, which captures 
changes in income distribution. Now, consider absolute poverty. Kakwani (1993) and Datt and 
Ravallion (1992) show that changes in absolute poverty, as for example measured by the share of 
population living below the poverty line of $1 per day, are also direct functions of average 
growth and changes in income distribution.   Although a large literature finds that financial   3 
development produces faster average growth (Levine, 1997, 2005), researchers have not yet 
determined whether financial development benefits the whole population equally, or whether it 
disproportionately benefits the rich or the poor. If financial development intensifies income 
inequality, this income distribution effect will mitigate – or even negate – the beneficial effects 
of financial development on the poor.   
Theory provides conflicting predictions about the impact of financial development on the 
distribution of income and the incomes of the poor. Some models imply that financial 
development enhances growth and reduces inequality. Financial imperfections, such as 
information and transactions costs, may be especially binding on the poor who lack collateral 
and credit histories. Thus, any relaxation of these credit constraints will disproportionately 
benefit the poor.  Furthermore, these credit constraints reduce the efficiency of capital allocation 
and intensify income inequality by impeding the flow of capital to poor individuals with high 
expected return investments (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Aghion and Bolton, 1997; Galor and Moav, 
2004). From this perspective, financial development helps the poor both by improving the 
efficiency of capital allocation, which accelerates aggregate growth, and by relaxing credit 
constraints that more extensively restrain the poor, which reduces income inequality.  
In contrast, some theories predict that financial development primarily helps the rich.  
According to this view, the poor rely on informal, family connections for capital, so that 
improvements in the formal financial sector inordinately benefit the rich. Greenwood and 
Jovanovic (1990) develop a model that predicts a nonlinear relationship between financial 
development, income inequality, and economic development. At all stages of economic 
development, financial development improves capital allocation, boosts aggregate growth, and 
helps the poor through this channel. However, the distributional effect of financial development, 
and hence the net impact on the poor, depends on the level of economic development.  At early   4 
stages of development, only the rich can afford to access and directly profit from better financial 
markets.  At higher levels of economic development, many people access financial markets so 
that financial development directly helps a larger proportion of society.  
This paper empirically assesses these conflicting views about the impact of financial 
development on the distribution of income and the incomes of the poor.  Rather than 
reexamining the finance-growth link, we assess the impact of financial development on changes 
in the distribution of income and changes in both relative and absolute poverty. Specifically, we 
examine (1) the Gini coefficient, which measures deviations from perfect income equality, (2) 
income share of the poor, which measures the income of the poorest quintile relative to total 
national income, and (3) the percentage of the population living on less than $1 per day.  Both 
the Gini coefficient and the income share of the poor measure income inequality; however, the 
income share of the poor focuses on the poorest quintile while the Gini coefficient includes 
information on the entire distribution of income.  Hence, we examine both inequality measures 
along with the percentage of the population living on less than $1 per day as a measure of 
absolute poverty. 
There are three key inter-related findings. First, financial development reduces income 
inequality. Specifically, there is a negative relationship between financial development and the 
growth rate of the Gini coefficient, which holds when controlling for real per capita GDP 
growth, lagged values of the Gini coefficient, a wide array of other country-specific factors, and 
when using panel instrumental variable procedures to control for endogeneity and other potential 
biases. 
Second, financial development exerts a disproportionately positive impact on the 
relatively poor.  Financial development boosts the growth rate of the income share of the poorest 
quintile.   Thus, finance helps the poor above and beyond the impact of financial development on   5 
aggregate growth.  More specifically, about 40% of the impact of financial development on the 
income growth of the poorest quintile is the result of reductions in income inequality, while the 
remainder of the impact of financial development on the poor is due to the effect of financial 
development on aggregate economic growth.  These results are robust to conditioning on many 
country traits and when employing a panel instrumental variable estimator to control for 
potential endogeneity bias. 
Third, financial development is strongly associated with poverty alleviation.  Greater 
financial development is associated with faster reductions in the fraction of the population living 
on less than $1 a day. For the median country, we find that half of the impact of financial 
development on this headcount measure of poverty is due to financial development accelerating 
economic growth, and half of the reduction in poverty is due financial development reducing 
income inequality.  Due to data limitations, however, we are unable to use the panel estimator to 
control for potential endogeneity.  Thus, these results on people living on less than $1 a day are 
subject to more qualifications than our findings that financial development reduces income 
inequality and disproportionately helps those in the bottom fifth of the distribution of income. 
This paper adds to a large policy-oriented literature on the relationship between 
inequality and growth.  While not without its critics (Forbes, 2000; Lundberg and Squire, 2003), 
considerable work finds that income inequality hurts growth (Perotti, 1996; Persson and 
Tabellini, 1994; Clarke, 1995; and Easterly, 2002). While capital market imperfections are often 
at the center of theoretical and empirical explanations of the negative relationship between 
inequality and growth, most researchers have focused on redistributive policies to reduce 
inequality with positive repercussions for economic growth (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2007).  
As reviewed by Aghion, Caroli and Peñalosa (1999), some models suggest that public policies 
that redistribute income from the rich to the poor will alleviate the adverse growth effects of   6 
income inequality and boost aggregate growth, though the adverse incentive effects of 
redistributive policies may temper their growth effects. Our paper highlights an alternative policy 
approach: Financial sector reforms that reduce market frictions will lower income inequality and 
boost growth without the potential incentive problems associated with redistributive policies.   
Our research also relates to work on how capital market imperfections influence child 
labor and schooling. Using household data from Peru, Jacoby (1994) finds that lack of access to 
credit perpetuates poverty because poor households reduce their kids’ education. Jacoby and 
Skoufias (1997) show that households from Indian villages without access to credit markets tend 
to reduce their children’s schooling when they receive transitory shocks more than households 
with greater access to financial markets. Similarly, Dehejia and Gatti (2003) find that child labor 
rates are higher in countries with under-developed financial systems, while Beegle, et al. (2003) 
show that transitory income shocks lead to greater increases in child labor in countries with 
poorly functioning financial systems. In contrast, we show that financial development exerts an 
especially pronounced impact on changes in relative and absolute poverty rates. 
Our analyses also contribute to cross-country studies. Dollar and Kraay (2002) find that 
in a regression where the dependent variable is income growth of the poor, aggregate growth 
enters with a coefficient of about one, and find that indicators of changes in national institutions 
and policies, including changes in financial development, do not explain income growth of the 
poor beyond their effects on aggregate growth.  We extend the data six years, examine growth of 
the income share of the poor, and allow lagged values of the income share of the poor to 
influence present values.  In our analyses, financial development boosts the growth rate of the 
lowest income share, thus improving income growth of the poor beyond its effect on aggregate 
growth.  In an analysis of income inequality, Clarke, et al. (2006) study the relationship between 
financial development and the level of the Gini coefficient. They find that financial development   7 
reduces income inequality.  In our analyses, we allow for potential dynamics in the Gini 
coefficient and show that the level of financial development reduces the growth rate of the Gini 
coefficient even when conditioning on average growth and lagged values of income inequality.  
Furthermore, distinct from both of these studies, we show that financial development is robustly 
linked with declines in the fraction of the population living on less than $1 per day.   
 
2. Data, summary statistics, and econometric methods 
To conduct our analyses, we need measures of financial development, income 
distribution, and poverty as well as econometric methods for ascertaining the relationship 
between finance and the poor.  This section describes the variables, discusses the econometric 
methods, and provides summary statistics and correlations. 
 
2.1. Data: financial development 
To measure financial development, we would ideally like indicators of the degree to 
which the financial system ameliorates information and transactions costs and facilitates the 
mobilization and efficient allocation of capital. We would like indicators of how well each 
country’s financial system researches firms and identifies profitable projects, exerts corporate 
control, facilitates risk management, mobilizes savings, and eases transactions. Unfortunately, no 
such measures are available across countries. Consequently, we rely on a commonly used 
measure of financial development that is robustly related to economic growth. 
Private Credit equals the value of credit by financial intermediaries to the private sector 
divided by GDP. This measure excludes credits issued by the central bank and development 
banks. Furthermore, it excludes credit to the public sector, credit to state-owned enterprises, and 
cross claims of one group of intermediaries on another. Thus, Private Credit captures the amount   8 
of credit channeled from savers, through financial intermediaries, to private firms. Private Credit 
is a comparatively comprehensive measure of credit issuing intermediaries since it also includes 
the credits of financial intermediaries that are not considered deposit money banks.  
Private Credit has demonstrable advantages over alternative measures of financial 
development.  For example, some researchers use M2 (broad money) as a share of GDP to proxy 
for financial development.  M2, however, does not measure a key function of financial 
intermediaries, which is the channeling of society’s savings to private sector projects. Other 
researchers use the ratio of commercial bank assets to commercial bank plus central bank assets, 
which was first developed by King and Levine (1993) to examine the determinants of economic 
growth and later employed by Dollar and Kraay (2002) to investigate income growth of the poor.  
However, in many countries, the central bank does not play a direct role in allocating credit, but 
may nonetheless influence the flow of credit by persuading banks to lend to favored sectors or 
firms.  Similarly, commercial banks are not the only financial institutions intermediating 
society’s resources.  Consequently, this measure may miss substantial cross-country variation in 
financial development.  Moreover, Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) and Beck, Levine, and 
Loayza (2000) show that Private Credit exerts a robust, positive impact on GDP per capita 
growth, further advertising the advantages of using Private Credit.  
Data on Private Credit are from the updated, online version of the Financial Structure 
Database, which is described in Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001). There is wide 
variation in Private Credit, ranging from less than 5% in Uganda to more than 120% in Hong 
Kong, Japan, and the Switzerland using data over the period 1980 to 2005. In line with the large 
finance and growth literature, we include the logarithm of Private Credit in the regressions 
reported below.  As we describe below, the period over which we calculate Private Credit varies 
across countries and econometric specifications because we match the period over which the   9 
regressors are calculated with data availability on each dependent variable. 
 
2.2. Data: Changes in income distribution and poverty alleviation 
To assess the impact of financial development on the poor, we examine (i) the growth of 
the Gini coefficient, (ii) the growth of the income share of the lowest quintile, and (iii) the 
growth of the percentage of the population living on less than $1 (and $2) dollars per day. The 
remainder of this subsection defines these dependent variables in more depth. 
Growth of Gini equals the annual growth rate of each country’s Gini coefficient, 
computed over the period 1960-2005.
 1 Specifically, we compute the log difference between the 
last and the first available observation and divide by the number of years between these two 
observations. The Gini coefficient is derived from the Lorenz curve, where larger values imply 
greater income inequality. In Austria, Finland, France, Gabon, Mauritius, Netherlands, and 
Senegal, the Gini coefficient shrank at a rate of more than one percent per annum, while Nigeria 
and Uganda saw their Gini coefficient grow at more than two percent per annum.   
Growth of Lowest Income Share equals the annual growth rate of the share of the 
lowest income quintile, computed over the period 1960-2005. Specifically, we compute the share 
of the lowest income quintile as the income of the country’s poorest quintile divided by the 
country’s total income.  Growth of lowest income share is then defined as the difference between 
the logarithm of the share of the lowest income quintile for the last observation and the logarithm 
of the share of the lowest income quintile for the first observation, and dividing this log 
difference by the number of years between the two observations.  
We use Growth of the lowest quintile to assess how financial development influences the 
poorest quintile of each economy. Examining the Growth of the poorest income quintile provides 
additional information from an analysis of the growth of the Gini coefficient because the Gini   10 
coefficient is a measure of the entire distribution of income, whereas Growth of the poorest 
income quintile only measures changes in the bottom quintile.  In some countries, the income 
share of the poorest quintile grew by more than 3% per year (Finland, France, Senegal and 
Trinidad and Tobago), while it dropped by more than 4% per year in others (Guatemala, Sierra 
Leone and Uganda).  
 For both Growth of poorest income share and Growth of Gini, we require a minimum of 
10 years difference between the first and last observation when computing growth rates for pure 
cross-country regressions. On average, there are 30 years between the first and last observation 
when computing growth rates, with a maximum of 43 years.
2  This produces identical coverage 
for the two data series and yields a sample of 72 developing and developed countries. Critically, 
for each country, we match the sample period of all of the regressors with the sample period 
covered by the dependent variable.  When we move from pure cross-country to panel estimates, 
we follow Dollar and Kraay (2002) and take values of income share of the poor and Gini that are 
at least five years apart. 
Growth of Headcount equals the growth rate of the percentage of the population living 
below $1 dollar per day (or $2 dollars per day). These data are based on household surveys and 
our sample comprises 68 developing and transition countries over the period 1980 to 2005 (Chen 
and Ravallion, 2001).
3 In the tables, we present the results using the $1 per day definition of 
poverty, but confirm all of the results using the poverty line cut-off of $2 per day.
4  Countries 
have experienced wide variations in poverty alleviation rates during the last two decades. For 
example, the share of population living on less than a dollar per day increased at an annual rate 
of 22% in Mongolia between 1995 and 1998.  In contrast, Headcount decreased by an annual rate 
of 36% in Jamaica between 1998 and 2003.  These large variations, however, also indicate that   11 
there might be measurement errors due to changes in the methodology, so that these large 
changes might reflect variations in measured rather than actual variation.  
There are substantially greater data limitations regarding the Growth of Headcount than 
for Income Growth of the lowest income share and Growth of Gini. Data on Headcount are only 
available for the 1980s and 1990s, and frequently only for the 1990s. Thus, we do not use a 10-
year minimum and simply calculate the annualized growth rates of Headcount for the longest 
available time span.  Using shorter time frames could magnify the influence of any outlier 
observations and make the results more sensitive to business cycle fluctuations or crises. 
Therefore, we assess the robustness of our results by (i) limiting the sample to countries for 
which the growth rate in Headcount is calculated over at least five years and (ii) eliminating 
outliers.  
 
2.3. Econometric methodologies: basic regression specifications 
2.3.1. Ordinary least squares regressions 
We begin by using cross-country regressions, calculating growth rates of income share, 
inequality and poverty over the longest available time period and averaging financial 
intermediary development and other explanatory variables over the corresponding time period.  
We use the following specification: 
. , , , 1 , , t i t i t i t i t i X FD y y ε γ β α + + + = −       ( 1 )  
This can be re-written as follows: 
. ) 1 ( , , , 1 , 1 , , t i t i t i t i t i t i X FD y y y ε γ β α + + + − = − − −     (2) 
In this regression, yi, t is either the logarithm of (i) share of lowest income quintile, (ii) the Gini 
coefficient, or (iii) headcount for country i in period t. FDi,t is the Private Credit measure of   12 
financial development, and Xi,t is a set of conditioning information for country i in period t.  In 
the OLS specifications, we use one observation per country, so that a period is defined as the 
range of years for which we have data for that country. We allow for the possibility that lagged 
values of the lowest income share, the Gini coefficient, and poverty influence present values.  As 
we demonstrate below, allowing for these dynamics is important empirically.  However, setting 
α  = 1 does not alter our findings on the relationship between financial development, income 
inequality, and the poor. 
In terms of the conditioning information, we control for GDP per capita growth in the 
growth of lowest income share and Growth of Gini regressions and for mean income growth in 
the Growth of Headcount regressions. In line with the cross-country growth literature, we also 
control for the logarithm of the average years of school attainment in the initial year as an 
indicator of the initial human capital stock in the economy (Schooling), the growth rate of the 
GDP deflator over the sample period to control for the macroeconomic environment (Inflation) 
and the sample period average of the sum of exports and imports as share of GDP to capture the 
degree of international openness (Trade Openness).  Further, in the headcount growth 
regressions, we include population growth and the ratio of the population below the age of 15 
and above the age of 65 to the population between the ages of 15 and 65 (Age dependency 
ratio) as additional regressors.    
 
2.3.2. Dynamic panel instrumental variables regressions 
The relationship between financial intermediary development and changes in income 
distribution and poverty might be driven by reverse causation.  For example, reductions in 
poverty may stimulate demand for financial services.  As another example, reductions in income 
inequality might lead to political pressures to create more efficient financial systems that fund   13 
projects based on market criteria, not political connections. To control for potential biases, we 
use a dynamic panel estimator.
5  
Besides endogeneity considerations, OLS regressions have other shortcomings that can 
be addressed using a dynamic panel estimator.  First, cross-country regressions do not fully 
control for unobserved country-specific effects. Second, even when using standard two-stage 
least squares regressions and using instruments for financial development, this does not control 
for the endogeneity of other explanatory variables, which may bias the coefficient estimates on 
financial development. Third, the specification in equation (2) includes a lagged dependent 
variable, which could bias the coefficient estimates.  Finally, the pure cross-country regression 
does not exploit the time-series dimension of the data. 
Thus, we use a generalized-methods-of-moments (GMM) panel estimator developed for 
dynamic models by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1990), Arellano and Bond (1991) and 
Arellano and Bover (1995).  In moving to a panel specification, we use data averaged over five 
year periods, rather than averaging over the entire span of the dependent variable.
6  Specifically, 
we estimate a system of the panel version of regression (2) in differences and in levels. We 
difference regression (2) and use the lagged values in levels of all explanatory variables as 
instruments.  Similarly, we use the lagged differences of all explanatory variables as instruments 
for the level version of regression (2). We then combine difference and level regressions in a 
system.  Thus, the panel estimator uses instrumental variables based on previous realizations of 
the explanatory variables (“internal” instruments).   Such a system gives consistent results under 
the assumptions that there is no second-order serial correlation and the instruments are 
uncorrelated with the error terms.  We test for the validity of these assumptions and present these 
test results below.    14 
 
2.4. Descriptive statistics and correlations        
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and correlations for the 1960-2005 and 1980-2005 
samples. Consistent with earlier work, financial development is positively and significantly 
correlated with GDP per capita growth. Financial development is not, however, significantly 
correlated with mean income growth from household surveys, which is consistent with 
Ravallion’s (2003a) finding of large discrepancies between average income growth numbers 
from national accounts and from household surveys. Private Credit is positively and significantly 
correlated with the Growth of poorest income share, but negatively correlated with Growth of 
Gini and Growth of Headcount (Honohan, 2004), indicating that countries with more developed 
financial systems experienced a faster reduction in the number of people living in poverty.  
 
3. Empirical Results 
3.1. Growth in the Gini coefficient 
In Table 2, the regression results show that countries with higher levels of financial 
intermediary development experienced faster reductions in the Gini coefficient over the period 
1960-2005.  In our baseline regression, we simply control for the log of the initial Gini 
coefficient.  Private Credit enters negatively and significantly.  Initial Gini also enters negatively, 
suggesting that countries starting the estimation period with more skewed distributions of income 
(high Initial Gini) tend to experience faster reductions in income inequality than countries with 
lower levels of initial income inequality.  
The economic effects are substantial.  Take the examples of neighboring Guatemala and 
El Salvador.  Guatemala has a ratio of private credit to GDP of 14%, while El Salvador has a 
ratio of 26%.  The regression results suggest that Guatemala’s Gini coefficient would have   15 
grown by only 0.6% per year over the period 1979-2000, rather than the actual 0.9%, had it had 
the level of Private Credit as El Salvador.  This would have resulted in a Gini coefficient of 56 in 
2000 rather than the actual 60.  
The negative relationship between financial development and the Growth of Gini is 
robust to a number of sensitivity tests. We first control for initial schooling, trade openness and 
inflation (column 2). While inflation is positively associated with the growth of income 
inequality, the negative relationship between Private Credit and Growth of Gini holds when 
conditioning on these factors.  We then control for GDP per capita growth since financial 
development may influence income inequality by affecting economic growth (column 3).  As 
shown, this does not alter the results on Private Credit and GDP per capita growth does not enter 
the inequality regression significantly.
7  Next, we control for the interaction between initial 
income inequality and GDP per capita growth, since the relationship between the Growth of Gini 
and aggregate economic growth might vary with the initial degree of income inequality (column 
4). The interaction term does not enter significantly.  Moreover, we confirm our main finding of 
a negative relation between Private Credit and growth in the Gini coefficient and the size of 
estimated coefficient on Private Credit does not change.  In column 5, we use our alternative 
indicator of financial intermediary development – Commercial-Central Bank – and confirm our 
findings.  The regression in column 6 shows that the negative relationship between Private Credit 
and Growth of Gini holds over the sample period 1980 to 2005.   
We also tested for the potential influence of outliers.  The Besley, Kuh and Welch (1980) 
procedure identifies Ethiopia, Hong Kong, Nigeria, Nepal, Tanzania, Uganda, the United States 
and Zambia as influential observations.  Re-running the regressions without these countries, 
however, confirms our finding of a negative and significant relation between Private Credit and 
Growth of Gini.   16 
Next, we address concerns about reverse causality and omitted variables. If changes in 
the distribution of income influence the demand for financial services or alter the political 
economy shaping financial regulations, then innovations in the Growth of Gini could affect 
Private Credit and bias our results.  Thus, we use the dynamic panel estimator to control for 
endogeneity, country specific factors, and the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable as a 
regressor.  Note that in moving to the panel estimation, we employ higher frequency data, which 
may affect the coefficient estimates.  As shown (column 7), the results hold: Financial 
development reduces the growth rate of income inequality.
8  Both the Sargan test of 
overidentifying restrictions and the second-order autocorrelation test are not rejected, providing 
support for our econometric specification. 
These results complement the work by Clarke, et al. (2006).  They find that finance is 
negatively associated with the level of the Gini coefficient using a panel estimator over the 1960-
95 period. Whereas they have 170 observations, we have 245 observations by extending the 
number of countries and years.  We also explicitly model the potential dynamics of the Gini 
coefficient by including lagged Gini, which enters significantly at the one percent level in all of 
the Table 2 regressions. Furthermore, we control for aggregate economic growth and show that 
finance influences income inequality beyond its effect on economic growth.  
 
3.2. Growth of the lowest income share 
The results presented in Table 3 indicate that financial development exerts a 
disproportionately positive impact on the poor.  In the simplest specification that only conditions 
on the initial income share of the poorest quintile, Private Credit enters negatively and 
significantly at the one percent level (column 1).  The log of the initial income share of the poor 
also enters negatively and significantly, suggesting that the lowest quintile is more likely to   17 
enjoy greater income gains than average in countries where the initial income share of the poor is 
very low.   
The coefficient estimates suggest that financial development has an economically 
substantive impact on the poorest income quintile. Take the example of Brazil and Canada with 
Private Credit of 33% and 63%, respectively.  Had Brazil had the same level of Private Credit as 
Canada over the period 1961 to 2000, the income share of the lowest income quintile would have 
fallen only by 0.1% every year rather than the actual 0.7%, which would have resulted in an 
income share of 3% for the lowest income quintile rather than the actual 2.4% in 2000. 
Robustness tests confirm that financial development positively and significantly boosts 
the share of income received by the poorest quintile. Private Credit continues to enter positively 
and significantly when controlling for Trade Openness, Inflation, and Schooling (column 2). 
Inflation enters significantly and negatively, suggesting that monetary instability hurts the lowest 
income quintile more than the average person in an economy.  Schooling and openness to trade 
do not enter significantly.  We further tested the robustness of the findings by including the 
growth rate of schooling and trade openness, rather than including the level of schooling and 
trade as reported in column 2.  When including the growth rates, Private Credit continues to enter 
positively and significantly, but neither the growth rate of schooling nor the growth of trade 
enters significantly. This does not suggest that Trade Openness and Schooling are unimportant 
for the share of the lowest income quintile. Rather, this result suggests that Trade Openness and 
Schooling do not have distributional effects when controlling for the level of financial 
development and the initial income share of the poor.  
The results further hold when conditioning on GDP per capita growth and allowing for 
potential non-linearities.  As shown in column 4, GDP per capita growth does not enter 
significantly and it does not alter the positive relationship between Private Credit and the growth   18 
in the lowest income share.  Furthermore, we do not find a non-linear relationship between GDP 
per capita growth and growth of the lowest income share.  The interaction term between initial 
income share and GDP per capita growth does not enter significantly and including this term 
does not affect the estimated coefficient on Private Credit (column 4).
9   
Furthermore, we consider an alternative measure of financial development, use a 
different estimation period, and test for the possible effects of outliers.  We argued above that 
Private Credit is a superior measure of financial development to Commercial-Central Bank, 
which equals the ratio of deposit money banks claims on the domestic economy to the sum of 
deposit money and central bank claims on the domestic economy.  Nevertheless, we also 
conducted the analyses with Commercial-Central Bank because Dollar and Kraay (2002) use this 
measure of financial development in their examination of income of the poor. The results in 
column 5 confirm finding that financial development disproportionately helps the poor: 
Commercial-Central Bank is positively associated with the growth rate of the poorest quintile 
when conditioning on GDP per capita growth, initial income share of the poor, initial schooling, 
trade openness and inflation.  This paper’s results also hold when limiting the estimation to the 
period 1980 to 2005 (column 6). Finally, we identify and assess the potential impact of outliers 
by following the methodology of Besley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980). The procedure identifies 
Guatemala, Hong Kong, Nepal, Singapore, Sierra Leone, Switzerland, Tanzania, Turkey, and 
Uganda as influential observations.  The results hold, however, when excluding these countries 
from the analysis.  
In unreported tests, we examined whether the relationship between financial development 
and Growth of lowest income share depends on the level of economic development or the level 
of educational attainment based on insights by Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) and Galor and 
Moav (2004).  We included (i) the interaction term of financial development and the level of   19 
economic development and (ii) the interaction term of financial development and educational 
attainment.  These interaction terms do not enter significantly.  Thus, we found no evidence that 
the relationship between financial development and income growth of the poor varies with the 
level of GDP per capita or the level of educational attainment. 
In Table 3, we also present results using the dynamic panel estimator that employs 
instrumental variables to control for potential endogeneity and omitted country-specific traits. As 
shown in column 7, we continue to find that financial development exerts a disproportionately 
positive impact on the growth of the income share of the poorest quintile. Private Credit enters 
with a p-value of 0.063, while conditioning on initial income share of the poor, initial schooling, 
trade openness, and inflation.  The larger coefficient on Private Credit in this panel regression 
relative to the OLS regressions primarily reflects the use of higher frequency data in the panel 
context. Neither of the specification tests – second-order autocorrelation and Sargan tests – is 
rejected, supporting the validity of the instrumental variable panel estimator. 
The distributional impact of Private Credit explains about 40% of the overall effect of 
financial intermediary development on income growth of the poor in the OLS specification, and 
an even larger fraction in the panel estimation.  As discussed above, income growth of the 
poorest income quintile can be decomposed into average income growth and growth in the 
income share of the lowest quintile.  Regressions 8 and 9 in Table 3 replicate standard GDP per 
capita growth regressions.  Private Credit enters positively and significantly with a coefficient of 
0.014.  This estimate is consistent with the findings of a large literature on finance and aggregate 
growth (Levine, 2005).   To compare the growth effect of Private Credit with the distribution 
effect, we compare regression 2, where Private Credit enters the growth of the lowest income 
share specification with a coefficient of 0.009, with regression 8, where Private Credit enters the 
per capita GDP growth regression with a coefficient of 0.014.  This implies that almost 40%   20 
(9/23) of the overall effect of Private Credit on the income growth of the lowest quintile is due to 
distributional changes in favor of the poorest quintile and the remaining 60% (14/23) is due to 
the overall growth effect of Private Credit.  The panel regressions suggest an even bigger 
distributional effect, with the distribution effect accounting for 56% (18/32) of the overall effect. 
In sum, the results in Tables 2 and 3 indicate that financial intermediary development 
exerts a disproportionately positive impact on the poor and reduces income inequality. Private 
Credit raises the incomes of the lowest income quintile beyond the overall income growth rate of 
incomes in the economy. Moreover, Private Credit reduces income inequality, as measured by 
the Gini coefficient, when controlling for the initial level of income inequality in the economy 
and average growth. Both results hold when using dynamic panel techniques to control for 
simultaneity bias and when controlling for an array of other country characteristics.     
 
3.3. Poverty alleviation 
Next, we examine the relationship between financial development and a measure of 
absolute poverty. As noted, a major shortcoming of the poverty analyses is that the data cover far 
fewer years. For the Growth of lowest income share and Growth of Gini analyses, we examined 
growth rates computed over an average of 30 years, with a minimum of 11 and a maximum of 43 
years. Thus, we were testing the impact of finance on long-run growth rates of income share of 
the poor and Gini coefficients. When examining changes in poverty, the growth rates are 
occasionally computed for less than five years and frequently for less than 10 years. This reduces 
confidence that the poverty alleviation results capture the relationship between financial 
development and reductions in poverty over long periods.  
To address concerns about limited time-series data on poverty, we undertake five actions. 
First, we control for average income growth. This isolates the relationship between financial   21 
development and poverty alleviation beyond the relationship between finance and aggregate 
growth.   Second, we confirm the Table 4 results when limiting the sample to only those 
countries where we have a minimum of five or even ten years of data. Third, given the limited 
poverty data for transition economies, the large fluctuations in their poverty rates, and the 
particularly acute measurement problems as they transited from socialism, we re-ran the 
regressions without them and confirmed the findings. Finally, we control for initial schooling, 
trade openness, inflation, population growth, and the demographic profile of each country so that 
we capture the relationship between finance and changes in poverty, not a spurious correlation 
involving a country specific trait.    
The Table 4 regression results suggest that financial development is associated with faster 
poverty alleviation. Private Credit enters negatively and significantly at the 5% level in all of the 
regressions.  Furthermore, we follow the same procedure as above and identify Albania, 
Malaysia, South Africa, Uganda and Yemen as influential observations.  The results are 
strengthened, however, when excluding these countries.  Private Credit enters with a coefficient 
of -0.074, significant at the 1% level. While we control for the log of the initial Headcount, it 
does not enter significantly and we confirm all the findings when excluding this variable. 
The negative relationship between financial development and the growth rate in poverty 
is robust to various sensitivity checks. In particular, the results hold when controlling for Trade 
openness, Schooling, and Inflation (column 2).  Furthermore, we also control for (1) the ratio of 
the population below the age of 15 and above the age of 65 to the population between the ages of 
15 and 65 (Age dependency ratio), (2) the average annual growth rate of the total population 
(Population growth) since these demographic traits may influence changes in poverty, and (3) the 
growth rate in mean income.  As shown in regression 3, including these country characteristics 
does not alter the results on financial development. Following Ravallion (1997) and   22 
Bourguignon (2003), we include an interaction term between the log of initial income inequality 
and growth.  This interaction term does not enter significantly, and it does not change our main 
finding of a negative and significant association between Private Credit and Growth of 
Headcount (column 4). Further, by including both mean income growth and its interaction with 
initial Gini, we control for the impact of financial development on changes in Headcount through 
aggregate growth and therefore isolate the impact of financial development on changes in 
Headcount through changes in the distribution of income.  The findings suggest that Private 
Credit is associated with poverty alleviation not just by fostering economic growth, but also by 
lowering income inequality. As shown in regression 5, the results on the relationship between 
financial development and reductions in poverty depend on the measure of financial 
development.  While there is a robust, negative relationship between Private Credit and 
Headcount, this relationship does not hold when using Commercial-Central Bank.  As argued 
earlier, we believe the Private Credit variable is a better indicator of financial development and it 
is more widely used in the literature.  Furthermore, selecting a poverty line is inherently 
arbitrary. Thus, we re-did the analyses of poverty alleviation using the $2 a day poverty line and 
confirm the findings. 
The relationship between Private Credit and poverty alleviation is economically large. 
Compare Chile (Private Credit = 47%) with Peru (Private Credit = 17%). In Chile, the 
percentage of the population living on less than $1 a day (Headcount) decreased at an annual 
growth rate of 14% between 1987 and 2000.  In Peru, the Headcount increased at an annual 
growth rate of 14% over the period 1985 to 2002. The coefficient estimate in column 1 indicates 
that if Peru had enjoyed Chile’s level of financial intermediary development, Headcount would 
have increased by five percentage points less per year, which implies that the share of the   23 
population living on less than one dollar a day in Peru would have been 5% in 2002 rather than 
the actual share of 12% of the population.  
Given the small number of intermittent observations on poverty in the sample, it is 
impossible to use dynamic panel estimation to control for endogeneity.  This limits the 
inferences that we can draw regarding the causal relationship between financial development and 
poverty.  Whereas the dynamic panel results on growth of the lowest income share and the 
growth of the Gini coefficient indicate that the exogenous component of financial development 
exerts a disproportionately positive effect on the poor, we cannot draw this conclusion regarding 
poverty alleviation. Rather, we can only say that the strong negative relationship between 
financial development and the growth rate of poverty is consistent with the earlier findings on 
growth of the lowest income share and the growth rate of the income inequality.   
In Table 5, we decompose the poverty reducing effect of financial development into the 
part associated with aggregate growth (growth component) and the part associated with 
reductions in income inequality (distribution component). Unlike in the case of income growth of 
the poorest quintile, however, the relative importance of the growth and distribution components 
varies with the ratio of the poverty-line to mean income and with the initial distribution of 
income. To do this, we first assume a lognormal distribution of income, which implies that the 
fraction of the population living below a particular poverty-line, such as $1 per day, is a function 
of the Gini coefficient and the ratio of the poverty-line to mean income.  For a lognormal 
distribution of income, Lopez and Serven (2006) compute the growth and distribution elasticities 
for different values of the Gini coefficient and the ratio of the poverty-line to mean income.  That 
is, they compute the percentage change in poverty for a given change in income or income 
inequality.  We then multiply these growth and Gini elasticities of the Headcount by the 
derivatives of GDP per capita and Gini coefficient with respect to Private Credit, respectively,   24 
which we obtain from the regression coefficients in Table 2 (regression 2) and Table 3 
(regression 8).  These effects vary with the ratio of poverty-line to mean income and the Gini 
coefficient.  Thus, Table 5 lists the relative importance of the distribution channel for different 
values of the poverty-mean income ratio and Gini coefficients.  For illustrative purposes, we 





th percentiles of our sample.  At the medians 
for both the poverty-mean income ratio and the Gini coefficient, the growth and distribution 
channels each accounts for about half of the reduction in poverty associated with financial 
development. The distribution channel is strongest for the richest countries with highly unequal 
income distributions.  In poor and more equal societies, on the other hand, the growth channel is 
relatively more dominant, accounting for up to 80% of the overall poverty reducing effect of 
Private Credit.
10  
    
IV. Conclusions 
  Although an extensive literature shows that financial development boosts the growth rate 
of aggregate per capita GDP, this does not necessarily imply that financial development helps the 
poor. If financial development increases average growth only by increasing the incomes of the 
rich and hence by increasing income inequality, then financial development will not help those 
with lower incomes. In this paper, we assessed the impact of financial development on income 
distribution and the poor. 
We found that financial development disproportionately helps the poor.  Greater financial 
development induces the incomes of the poor to grow faster than average per capita GDP 
growth, which lowers income inequality.  The results indicate that financial development helps 
the poorest quintile beyond finance’s affect on aggregate growth. Indeed, we find that 60% of the 
impact of financial development on the poorest quintile works through aggregate growth and   25 
about 40% operates through reductions in income inequality.  Furthermore, these results hold 
when using a dynamic panel instrumental variable estimator that controls for potential biases 
associated with endogeneity, country fixed effects, and the inclusion of lagged dependent 
variables as regressors. We also examined changes in the fraction of the population living on less 
than $1 per day.  While subject to more qualifications because of greater data limitations, we 
found that greater financial development is associated with poverty alleviation, even when 
controlling for average growth and other country traits.  Although the results show that financial 
development is particularly beneficial to the poor, this research is silent on how to foster poverty-
reducing financial development.  Future work needs to examine the linkages between particular 
policies toward the financial sector and poverty alleviation.   26 
                                                 
1We use income quintile and Gini data from Dollar and Kraay (2002) and UNU-WIDER (2006) to compute the level 
and growth rate of this variable. Dollar and Kraay obtain income share and Gini data from Deininger and Squire 
(1996), the UN-WIDER World Income Inequality Database, Chen and Ravallion (2000) and Lundberg and Squire 
(2000). We update their data with more recent data points from UNU-WIDER (2006).   
2 We could not compute regression-based growth rates because many countries do not have data for every year and 
therefore lack sufficient observations.  While our growth rates are thus subject to measurement error in the 
endpoints, we confirm our findings using an alternative sample period, 1980 to 2005. 
3 These data are available at http://research.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp.  While poverty data are 
available for a larger number of countries, limited overlap with financial development data limits the sample.   
4 As a robustness check, we also computed the Poverty Gap, which is a weighted measure of (i) the fraction of the 
population living on less than one dollar per day and (ii) how far below one dollar per day incomes lie.  Thus, 
Poverty Gap measures both the breadth and depth of poverty.  Nonetheless, growth of the Poverty Gap and Growth 
of Headcount are extremely highly correlated (0.94) and the results hold using the Poverty Gap measure. 
5 We confirm the panel results using standard two-stage least squares regressions.  To select instrumental variables 
for financial development, we focus on exogenous national characteristics that theory and past empirical work 
suggest influence financial development. We follow the finance and growth literature and use the legal origin of 
countries and the absolute value of the latitude of the capital city, normalized between zero and one, as instrumental 
variables. (See Beck and Levine, 2005; Beck et al 2003; Easterly and Levine, 2003; and Levine, 2006).  We also 
tried alternative instrument sets, including the religious composition of countries and ethnic fractionalization based 
on research by Beck et al (2003, 2006) and Easterly and Levine (1997), and obtained very similar results. 
6 Since data for income of the poor and the Gini coefficient are not necessarily available on a five-year frequency, 
we follow Dollar and Kraay (2002) and start out with the first available observation and then look for the next 
observation that is at least five years later.  As in the cross-country regressions, the sample period of the regressors is 
matched to the sample period of the dependent variable.  
7 In unreported regressions, we also find that controlling for the square of GDP per capita growth does not affect the 
findings on Private Credit.  Furthermore, we tested for non-linearities by including the squared term of Private 
Credit, but this term never entered significantly.   27 
                                                                                                                                                             
8 We also explored alternative dynamic structures for the Gini coefficient following Ravallion (2003b).  Specifically, 
we allwed for a a trend in inequality that depends on the initial distribution of income distribution.  However, we did 
not find any evidence for a time trend in the Gini coefficient in our sample. 
9 Controlling for the square of GDP per capita growth also does not affect the parameter estimate on Private Credit. 
10 We do not report regression results of the distribution and growth components of changes in Headcount as 
performed by Kraay (2006) since the sample is very small and short. However, when we follow Kraay’s (2006) 
methods, we find that the impact of financial development on the poor runs primarily through the distribution 
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 Table 1: Summary Statistics and Correlations 
 
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics and Panels B and C present the correlations.  Growth of the lowest income share equals 
the annual change in the logarithm of the income share of the poorest quintile over the period 1960-2005. Growth of Gini is the 
annual change in the logarithm of the Gini coefficient over the period 1960-2005. GDP per capita growth equals the growth rate 
of real GDP per capita over the periods 1960-2005. Growth in mean income is computed from household surveys and averaged 
over the period 1980–2005. Private Credit equals claims of financial institutions on the private sector as a share of GDP averaged 
over the periods 1960-2005 and 1980-2005 respectively. Growth of Headcount is the annual growth rate of the percentage of the 
population living on $1 a day or less, over the period 1980-2005.  Panel B presents correlations for the period 1960-2005. Panel 
C presents correlations for the sample 1980-2005. Detailed variable definitions and sources are in the appendix.  
 
Panel A: 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev  Min  Max 
Private  Credit,  1960-2005  72  0.399 0.311 0.030 1.377 
Growth of lowest income share  72  -0.00  0.018  -0.045  0.039 
Growth in Gini  72  0.000  0.009  -0.019  0.032 
GDP per capita growth, 60-05  72  0.021  0.015  -0.019  0.067 
Private  Credit,  1980-2005  68  0.237 0.148 0.034 0.746 
Growth of Headcount  68  -0.029  0.101  -0.358  0.221 








share  Growth in Gini 
Growth of lowest income share  0.3912***      
Growth in Gini  -0.2239*  -0.7394***   
GDP per capita growth, 60-05  0.5914***  0.1485  -0.0988 









Growth of Headcount  -0.309**   
Growth in mean income, 80-05  0.109  -0.738*** 
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Table 5: Finance and Poverty Alleviation – Growth vs. Distribution 
 
This table reports the relative importance of the distribution channel in the relationship between Growth in Headcount and Private Credit.  
We calculate the growth and distribution elasticity of Headcount following Lopez and Serven (2006) for values of the poverty-line ($372)-





th percentiles of the sample of 68 countries in Table 4.  We then 
multiply the growth elasticities with 0.014, the Private Credit coefficient in column (8) of Table 3 to obtain the growth effect of Private 
Credit, and the distribution elasticities with -0.005, the Private Credit coefficient of column (2) in Table 2 to obtain the distribution effect. We 
then compute the ratio of the distribution effect to the sum of growth and distribution effects.  
 
    Poverty line/mean income 















            
1
st Percentile 
(0.25)   0.1912  0.3307 0.4474 0.4994  0.5684 
25
th Percentile 
(0.33)   0.2147  0.3498 0.4630 0.5134  0.5804 
Median 
(0.44)   0.2567  0.3840 0.4908 0.5385  0.6018 
75
th Percentile 
(0.50)   0.2942  0.4144 0.5155 0.5607  0.6208 
99
th Percentile 
(0.60)   0.3613  0.4688 0.5596 0.6003  0.6545 
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